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INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Windsor,1 the United States Supreme Court
struck down a provision of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)2
that precluded the federal government from affording legal recogni-
tion to same-sex marriages valid in the states.3 After that opinion was
issued, several circuit courts held that the right to marry a same-sex
partner is protected by the Federal Constitution,4 although the Sixth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.5 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether
the Fourteenth Amendment protects same-sex marriage,6 and has
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
3. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate pur-
pose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State,
by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”). The statute thereby
struck down was 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
4. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2931
(2015); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 649 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014);
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Kitchen
v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
5. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040
(2015).
6. DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015).
1
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issued an opinion declaring that same-sex marriage bans violate
federal constitutional guarantees.7
The Supreme Court framed two distinct issues when agreeing
to review the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans:
whether states must license marriages between members of the
same sex, and whether states must recognize same-sex marriages
validly celebrated elsewhere.8 By doing so, the Court might seem to
have to have left some “room for play in the joints” 9—the Court
could offer what might be thought a compromise position by holding
that states need not permit same-sex marriages to be celebrated
locally but must recognize such marriages if validly celebrated else-
where. This Article addresses why the Court was very unlikely to
adopt that view, and some of the implications that would have fol-
lowed were the Court to have so held.
Part I of this Article discusses some of the differing bases upon
which the Court might have held that the Federal Constitution
protects the right to marry a same-sex partner. Part II discusses
interstate recognition of marriage practices and why the Court was
unlikely to hold that states must recognize same-sex marriages
validly celebrated elsewhere, but need not allow them to be cele-
brated locally. The Article concludes with a discussion of some of the
differing positions that the Court might have taken and some of the
implications of those positions.
I. THE RIGHT TO MARRY A SAME-SEX PARTNER
Several circuit courts addressed whether the right to marry a
same-sex partner is protected by the United States Constitution.10
The Sixth Circuit was the only circuit to issue an opinion upholding
state same-sex marriage bans,11 and the Court granted certiorari to
review that opinion.12 Yet, the virtual unanimity in result among
7. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry is a fun-
damental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not
be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
8. DeBoer, 135 S. Ct. at 1040 (“1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to
license marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment
require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their
marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?”).
9. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S.
712, 718 (2004)).
10. See supra notes 4–5.
11. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040
(2015).
12. DeBoer, 135 S. Ct. at 1040.
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the circuits should not be permitted to mask that the circuit courts
have offered very different analyses of why state same-sex marriages
bans fail to pass muster.
A. The Right to Marry
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the
right to marry implicates a fundamental interest.13 In Loving v.
Virginia,14 the Court examined Virginia’s interracial marriage ban,
holding that the Virginia anti-miscegenation laws “deprive the
Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”15 Although that was
not the only respect in which the Virginia statutory scheme violated
constitutional guarantees,16 Loving has come to stand for the propo-
sition that the right to marry is a fundamental interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.17
In Zablocki v. Redhail,18 the Court fleshed out some of the reasons
that marriage is protected as a fundamental interest.19 At issue was
the constitutionality of a law limiting the marriage rights of indigent
non-custodial fathers.20 Basically, “no Wisconsin resident in the af-
fected class may marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere without a court
order,” 21 and no order could be obtained if the fathers “either lack[ed]
the financial means to meet their support obligations or [could not]
prove that their children [would] not become public charges.” 22
The Court explained that certain individuals “will never be able
to obtain the necessary court order . . . .” 23 The fact that some indi-
viduals would never be able to marry, however, did not establish the
13. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
14. 383 U.S. 1 (1967). 
15. Id. at 12.
16. See infra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s holding that
the Virginia laws violated equal protection guarantees).
17. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (noting that the “leading
decision of this Court on the right to marry is Loving v. Virginia”).
18. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
19. Id. at 383–85.
20. Id. at 375 n.1 (“Wisconsin Stat. § 245.10 provides in pertinent part: ‘(1) No Wis-
consin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation
to support by any court order or judgment, may marry in this state or elsewhere, without
the order of either the court of this state which granted such judgment or support order,
or the court having divorce jurisdiction in the county of this state where such minor issue
resides or where the marriage license application is made. No marriage license shall be
issued to any such person except upon court order.’ ”).
21. Id. at 387.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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restriction’s unconstitutionality, because such a statute would be
upheld if “supported by sufficiently important state interests and is
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.” 24 The Court pro-
ceeded to examine whether the state’s interests were sufficiently
important and whether the statute was sufficiently closely tailored
to promote those interests.25
Unlike the Virginia statutory scheme at issue in Loving that
was motivated by “invidious racial discrimination,” 26 the Wisconsin
statute at issue in Zablocki was motivated to achieve legitimate
ends27—Wisconsin was seeking to promote the welfare of its chil-
dren.28 Further, by inducing fathers to pay child support, the state
might thereby reduce the number of children dependent upon the
state for support.29 Those rationales were legitimate and, possibly,
substantial.30 Because the statute was not sufficiently closely tai-
lored to achieve those ends,31 however, the state could not “justify
the statute’s broad infringement on the right to marry.” 32
The Zablocki Court noted that “the right to marry is of fundamen-
tal importance for all individuals,” 33 and that this right “is part of
the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause.” 34 Treating the right to marry as so
24. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678,
686 (1977)).
25. Id. at 388–91.
26. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
27. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (“We may accept for present purposes that these are
legitimate and substantial interests, but, since the means selected by the State for
achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry, the statute can-
not be sustained.”).
28. Id. (“Appellant asserts that . . . the welfare of the out-of-custody children is
protected.”).
29. Id. at 389 (“[A]ppellant’s counsel suggested that, since permission to marry can-
not be granted unless the applicant shows that he has satisfied his court-determined
support obligations to the prior children and that those children will not become public
charges . . . .”).
30. Cf. id. at 388 (“We may accept for present purposes that these are legitimate and
substantial interests . . . .”); see also JoLynn M. Schlichting, Note, Minnesota’s Proposed
Same-Sex Marriage Amendment: A Flamingly Unconstitutional Violation of Full Faith
and Credit, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1649, 1670
(2005) (noting that the statute implicated “legitimate and substantial state interests”).
31. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 390 (“[T]he challenged provisions . . . are grossly
underinclusive . . . . The statutory classification is substantially overinclusive as well.”);
see also Sherri L. Toussaint, Comment, Defense of Marriage Act: Isn’t It Ironic . . . Don’t
You Think? A Little Too Ironic?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 924, 970 (1997) (discussing “the Zablocki
Court’s finding that the marriage regulations were both significantly underinclusive and
overinclusive”).
32. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389.
33. Id. at 384.
34. Id.
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important makes eminent sense in light of how other rights involv-
ing family interests are treated.
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on
the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships, . . . [because]
it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with re-
spect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the de-
cision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family
in our society.35
Members of the LGBT community are engaging in a variety of
decisions involving family matters ranging from whether to have or
raise children to how such children should be raised.36 The Zablocki
rationale would seem to have great import for the burden that states
must bear insofar as they wish to prohibit same-sex marriage—
otherwise, the states would be in the position of recognizing that
members of the LGBT community have various rights to “procre-
ation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships” 37 but “not
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the
foundation of the family in our society.” 38 Recognizing that families
involving same-sex partners and their children have many of the
same interests as do families involving different-sex partners and
their children, some circuit courts have suggested that same-sex
marriage bans implicate the fundamental right to marry and do not
pass constitutional muster.39
In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court considered a prison mar-
riage regulation that “permit[ted] an inmate to marry only with the
permission of the superintendent of the prison, and provide[d] that
such approval should be given only ‘when there are compelling reasons
35. Id. at 386.
36. Cf. William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1949 (2012) (“LGBT persons
form lasting romantic relationships and raise children, with all the joys and problems
straight couples have.”).
37. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
38. Id.
39. Cf. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014)
(“Virginia’s same-sex marriage bans impermissibly infringe on its citizens’ fundamental
right to marry . . . .”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 265 (2014) (“We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental
right to marry, establish a family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of a state’s
marital laws. A state may not deny the issuance of a marriage license to two persons, or
refuse to recognize their marriage, based solely upon the sex of the persons in the mar-
riage union.”); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (“The Court
now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.”).
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to do so.’ ” 40 When striking down the regulation,41 the Court articu-
lated several of the interests implicated in marriage. Marriage is an
“expression[ ] of emotional support and public commitment.” 42 For
many, marriage has “spiritual significance; . . . the commitment of
marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expres-
sion of personal dedication.” 43 Marriage often involves a sexual com-
ponent—“most . . . marriages are formed in the expectation that they
ultimately will be fully consummated.” 44 In addition, there is a prac-
tical component, because “marital status often is a precondition to
the receipt of government benefits . . . .” 45
The important attributes of marriage discussed in Turner focused
on the relationship between the adults. When holding that same-sex
marriage bans are unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit recognized that
the ruling would have important implications for the children raised
by same-sex couples,46 but also acknowledged the importance of mar-
riage for adults who have no wish to have or raise children.47 The
Tenth Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court treated
“the fundamental right to marry as separate from the right to procre-
ate,” 48 citing Turner for support.49 Whether because of the impor-
tance of marriage for the children who might be raised or because of
its significance for the adults in the relationship, the reasons that mar-
riage implicates a fundamental interest for different-sex couples also
support its implicating a fundamental interest for same-sex couples.50
B. Equal Protection
Much of the Loving opinion involved why Virginia’s anti-mis-
cegenation law violated equal protection guarantees.51 The Court
40. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b–2000bb (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 97 (“[T]he marriage regulation does not withstand scrutiny.”).
42. Id. at 95.
43. Id. at 96.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1214 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265
(2014) (noting that “childrearing, a liberty closely related to the right to marry, is one exer-
cised by same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike”).
47. See id. at 1220.
48. Id. at 1210.
49. See id. at 1211.
50. See Mark Strasser, Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage Bans: On Constitutional
Interpretation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1020 (2004) (“Given that
all of these interests are also implicated for same-sex couples and the right to marry is
of fundamental importance for all individuals, the right to marry a same-sex partner
should be held to be constitutionally protected . . . .”).
51. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1–12 (1967). The due process argument was found
on only one page. Id. at 12.
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explained: “The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial mar-
riages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifi-
cations must stand on their own justification, as measures designed
to maintain White Supremacy.” 52 Marriage laws are unsupportable
on such a basis—“restricting the freedom to marry solely because of
racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.” 53
Loving suggests that marriage bans may be struck down if ani-
mus-based.54 The Windsor Court suggested that DOMA was passed
in order to burden members of the LGBT community and for that
reason, among others, was constitutionally infirm.55 “DOMA seeks
to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. By doing so it vio-
lates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to
the Federal Government.” 56 When holding the federal statute un-
constitutional, the Court explained that “no legitimate purpose over-
comes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom
the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and
dignity.” 57 Here, the Court did not make clear the level of scrutiny
that it was employing.58
Circuit courts addressing the constitutionality of same-sex mar-
riage bans under equal protection guarantees have employed differing
levels of scrutiny. The Seventh Circuit suggested that same-sex
marriage bans violate equal protection guarantees even using the
rational basis test.59 The Ninth Circuit struck down same-sex mar-
riage bans as a violation of equal protection guarantees using height-
ened scrutiny.60
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 11 (“There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination . . . .”).
55. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013).
56. Id. at 2693.
57. Id. at 2696.
58. Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The opinion does not resolve and indeed does
not even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under
the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are re-
viewed for more than mere rationality.”).
59. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 665 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014)
(“At the very least, ‘a [discriminatory] law must bear a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose.’ Indiana’s ban flunks this undemanding test.”) (alteration in
original) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)). But see DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388, 405 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) (upholding same-
sex marriage bans under rational basis review).
60. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464–65 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2931
(2015) (“We hold that the Idaho and Nevada laws at issue violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they deny lesbians and gays who wish to
marry persons of the same sex a right they afford to individuals who wish to marry
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Arguably, state same-sex marriage bans violate both due process
and equal protection guarantees.61 The Windsor Court foreshadowed
some of the considerations that were mentioned when the Obergefell
Court issued an opinion concerning the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage bans, although other considerations were noticeably ab-
sent.62 For example, the Windsor Court noted that  “[t]he Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’
justify disparate treatment of that group.” 63 The Court interpreted
Congress’s motivation behind the passage of DOMA to be animus64—
the “avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question
are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma
upon all who [would] enter into same-sex marriages . . . .” 65 Preclud-
ing same-sex couples from marrying “diminish[es] the stability and
predictability of basic personal relations” 66 and, further, “demeans
the couple . . . .” 67 A same-sex marriage ban “makes it even more
difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness
of their own family and its concord with other families in their
community and in their daily lives.” 68 Further, such a prohibition
“instructs . . . all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, in-
cluding their own children, that their [relationship] is less worthy
than [those] of others.” 69
In addition, the Windsor Court noted some of the practical effects
of the refusal to recognize same-sex marriages, including that prohib-
iting such unions “prevents same-sex married couples from obtaining
government . . . benefits they would otherwise receive.” 70 Indeed, such
laws may bring “financial harm to children of same-sex couples.” 71
persons of the opposite sex, and do not satisfy the heightened scrutiny standard we adopted
in SmithKline.”) (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th
Cir. 2014)).
61. Mark Strasser, Let Me Count the Ways: The Unconstitutionality of Same-Sex-
Marriage Bans, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 301, 302 (2013) (“The analysis here suggests that
same-sex-marriage bans violate both equal-protection and due-process guarantees.”); see
also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015) (“[U]nder the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not
be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
62. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–94.
63. Id. (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2694.
67. Id.
68. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
69. Id. at 2696.
70. Id. at 2694.
71. Id. at 2695.
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The Obergefell Court suggested that state same-sex marriage
bans violate federal equal protection guarantees.72 Further, some of
the points made in Windsor were reiterated in Obergefell, for exam-
ple, that same-sex marriage bans are harmful and demeaning to
same-sex couples and their children.73 The Court did not attribute
animus to those supporting same-sex marriage bans, however, instead
suggesting that “[m]any who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong
reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises . . . .” 74
Not all of Windsor focused on equal protection and due process
protections. Some of the opinion focused on federalism concerns,75
and Chief Justice Roberts implied that Windsor was basically a fed-
eralism opinion.76 Such an interpretation, however, was undermined
by the opinion itself, for example, when the majority suggested that it
was “unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state
power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the fed-
eral balance.” 77 The basis of the Court’s decision involved something
“quite apart from principles of federalism.” 78
The DOMA section at issue was constitutionally offensive for
non-federalism reasons—“DOMA . . . violates basic due process and
equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.” 79
Nonetheless, federalism concerns were discussed in Windsor and it
appeared that federalism concerns might play an important role in
Obergefell—when granting certiorari to decide the constitutionality
of same-sex marriage bans, the Supreme Court directed that an-
other issue also be briefed, namely, whether the refusal to recognize
same-sex marriages validly celebrated elsewhere itself violates con-
stitutional guarantees.80
72. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
73. Id. at 2602 (“But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and
public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an
exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.”); see
also id. at 2606 (“April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse now ask whether Michigan may continue
to deny them the certainty and stability all mothers desire to protect their children . . . .”).
74. Id. at 2602.
75. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691–93.
76. Id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The dominant theme of the majority opinion
is that the Federal Government’s intrusion into an area ‘central to state domestic rela-
tions law applicable to its residents and citizens’ is sufficiently ‘unusual’ to set off alarm
bells. I think . . . it . . . undeniable that [the Court’s] judgment is based on federalism.”)
(internal citation omitted).
77. Id. at 2692 (majority opinion).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2693.
80. DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 1040, 1040 (2015) (“Does the Fourteenth Amendment
require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their
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II. INTERSTATE MARRIAGE RECOGNITION
Marriage is governed by state rather than federal law.81 Tradi-
tionally, marriage regulations among the states have differed on a few
different bases, including age and consanguinity,82 which means
that individuals precluded by law from marrying in one state might
be able to marry in another. If a couple domiciled in one state marries
in another state in accord with local law and then returns home, the
domicile may need to decide whether to recognize that marriage.83
A. Differing Marriage Scenarios
Many types of marriages are recognized throughout the United
States.84 Individuals living in one state may marry in another and
feel confident that their marriages will be recognized at home.85
Some types of marriage, however, are permitted in some states and
not in others, and a question that sometimes arises is whether a
marriage valid where celebrated will be treated as valid by other
states.86 Traditionally, the answer to that question has depended in
part upon the law of the domicile at the time of the marriage.87
marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?”). The Obergefell Court spent
relatively little time when addressing this issue. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2607–08 (2015).
81. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 850 (1997) (“[D]omestic relations law is primarily an
area of state concern . . . .”) (citing In re Marriage of Campa, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362, 367–68
(Ct. App. 1979)).
82. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 354 (2005) (“Mar-
riage laws of states often differ in particulars such as age and consanguinity rules.”).
83. Cf. Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles’ Refusing to Rec-
ognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339, 353 (1998) (“A state might decide to
recognize all nonincestuous, nonbigamous marriages that were valid in the state of celebra-
tion, even if some of those marriages could not be legally celebrated within the domicile.”).
84. See infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
85. See Mark Strasser, Windsor, Federalism, and the Future of Marriage Litigation,
37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER ONLINE 1, 8 (2013), http://harvardjlg.com/2013/11/windsor
-federalism-and-the-future-of-marriage-litigation [http://perma.cc/4T4B-S4YP] (“[A]
‘marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was con-
tracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy
of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage.’ ”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971)).
86. Cf. id. at 7 (discussing Congress’s decision to pass DOMA after Hawaii began rec-
ognizing same-sex marriages in 1993).
87. Id. (“It has long been understood that a domicile can refuse to recognize a marriage
of its domiciliaries if they seek to circumvent the domicile’s law by temporarily going to
a different state and celebrating their marriage in accord with the latter state’s law.”).
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Consider the following scenarios:
1. A and B are domiciled in State S and marry there in
accord with local law.
2. A and B are domiciled in State S. They are precluded
by local law from marrying, so they go to State T, marry
in accord with local law, and then return to their domi-
cile to live.
3. A and B are domiciled in State T, where they marry in
accord with local law. A few years later, an excellent em-
ployment opportunity presents itself in State S. A and
B move to State S to take advantage of the opportunity.
Regrettably, State S does not permit individuals like
A and B to intermarry.
In the first scenario in which a couple marries in accord with
the domicile’s law and remains there, the marriage is valid.88 The
individuals have married in accord with local law and have the rea-
sonable expectation that their marriage is and will remain valid.89
Even were the domicile’s marriage laws to change subsequently, the
marriage would still have been contracted legally at the time of its
creation and the state might well be required to recognize that
marriage, notwithstanding that relevantly similar couples could not
celebrate such a marriage in the state once the marriage regulations
had changed.90
Suppose that a state refused to recognize certain marriages con-
tracted in other states, even though those marriages could be cele-
brated locally. It is difficult to imagine what important public policy
could justify such a refusal to recognize those out-of-state marriages
except, perhaps, for economic protectionism.91 Such a refusal would
be quite unlikely to pass constitutional muster, assuming that no
88. See Strasser, supra note 83, at 346 (“Consider a marriage that is celebrated in the
state where both parties are domiciled and where they intend to make their home. This
would be the paradigmatic example of a valid marriage, assuming that the marriage is
valid according to the law of that state.”).
89. See id. at 349–52.
90. See Caspar v. Snyder, 77 F. Supp.3d 616, 620 (2015) (holding that Michigan had
to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated in accord with local law).
91. Economic protectionism would likely not win the day as a justification. See
Andrew J. Brege, Comment, Michigan’s Waste Problems: How Expansion of the Bottle
Bill and Other Options Could Help Michigan Defeat the Dormant Commerce Clause and
Out-of-State Waste, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 303, 316 (2006) (“[I]t is well documented that
economic protectionism is not a valid justification for enacting legislation.”).
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other marital restrictions were implicated,92 if only because of Dor-
mant Commerce Clause concerns.93
In the second scenario, a couple celebrates a marriage else-
where precisely because the domicile prohibits the marriage. In this
kind of case, the couple may well be consciously evading local law94
and may be thought not to have a reasonable expectation that their
marriage will be recognized.95 Traditionally, in this kind of case, the
domicile may, but need not, recognize the marriage validly cele-
brated elsewhere.96
In the third kind of scenario in which the couple marries in accord
with the domicile’s law and then later moves to another state, the
couple will not have consciously evaded their domicile’s law but will
instead have acted in accordance with it. Traditionally, when the
couple marries with the intention of staying within the domicile
92. Suppose that the parties were considered too young to contract a marriage. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.02 (West 2015) (“Every person who has attained the full age of
18 years is capable in law of contracting into a civil marriage, if otherwise competent.
A person of the full age of 16 years may, with the consent of the person’s legal custodial
parents, guardian, or the court, as provided in section 517.08, receive a license to marry,
when, after a careful inquiry into the facts and the surrounding circumstances, the
person’s application for a license and consent for civil marriage of a minor form is ap-
proved by the judge of the district court of the county in which the person resides.” In
that event, the reason for the marriage non-recognition would be the ages rather than
the sexes of the parties.).
93. Cf. Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex “Marriage” and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 57 (1998) (suggesting that in the hypothetical posed here the
state would be saying “we refuse to recognize this marriage because it is not ours”). It
is perhaps because it would be so difficult to imagine the legitimate basis upon which
such recognition could be denied that the Obergefell Court said that “there is no lawful
basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another
State on the ground of its same-sex character.” See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2607–08 (2015).
94. The Lovings were convicted of violating Virginia’s evasion statute. See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (“The Lovings were convicted of violating § 20-58 of the
Virginia Code: ‘Leaving State to evade law.—If any white person and colored person shall
go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning,
and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and
wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed
by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation
here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage.’ ”).
95. See Mark Strasser, An Analysis of the Federal Constitutional Right to Same-Sex
Marriage, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 761, 773 (2002) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE
GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002) (noting that a couple
who evaded the domicile’s marriage law “is least likely to be thought to have had a rea-
sonable and justified expectation that their marriage would be recognized”)).
96. Mark Strasser, What If DOMA Were Repealed? The Confused and Confusing
Interstate Marriage Recognition Jurisprudence, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 249, 254 (2010) (“A
domicile could choose to recognize a marriage that was valid where celebrated but pro-
hibited locally, but does not have to do so.”).
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rather than, for example, moving immediately after the celebration of
the marriage,97 the marriage’s validity is determined in light of the
law of the domicile at the time of the marriage.98
B. The Lessons of Loving
Loving was important because it made clear that state marriage
regulations implicate both due process99 and equal protection con-
cerns.100 Yet another aspect of the Loving opinion meriting consider-
ation involves an approach that the Court not only did not use but
did not even mention in the opinion, namely, the claim that the
Lovings’ marriage had to be recognized because it was valid where
celebrated.101
Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving, an interracial couple,102 were
Virginia residents103 who were barred from marrying by local law.104
They celebrated their marriage in the District of Columbia, where
their marrying was permitted.105 They then went back to Virginia
to live.106 The Lovings were charged with and pled guilty to violating
Virginia’s interracial marriage prohibition.107 The trial court sen-
tenced each to a year in jail, but suspended the sentences on the
condition that the Lovings not be in Virginia together for twenty-
five years.108 Had the United States Supreme Court not invalidated
that decision, the Lovings would not have been able to go to Virginia
together to visit family and friends.109
97. Strasser, supra note 85, at 17 (“[I]f parties plan to move immediately after their
wedding to a different state, the marriage would have to be in accord with the law of the
state where the couple intended to live . . . .”).
98. See Strasser, supra note 96, at 249 (“[T]he law of the domicile at the time of a
marriage’s celebration has long been understood to determine the validity of that
marriage . . . .”).
99. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; see also supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
100. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12; see also supra text accompanying notes 51–53.
101. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2 (“Mildred Jeter . . . and Richard Loving . . . were mar-
ried in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws.”).
102. Id. (discussing “Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man”).
103. Id. (discussing “two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter . . . and Richard Loving”).
104. Id. at 4 (discussing the “comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting
and punishing interracial marriages”).
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id. (“Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established
their marital abode in Caroline County.”).
107. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (“[A] grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings
with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages.”).
108. Id. (“On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sen-
tenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period
of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia
together for 25 years.”).
109. Cf. John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 51 HOW.
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At least one question raised by this chronology of events is why
the Loving Court did not simply say that the marriage had to be rec-
ognized by Virginia because it was validly celebrated in the District
of Columbia. One possible explanation is that if Virginia had been
permitted to prohibit such marriages locally, it could also have refused
to recognize its domiciliaries’ marriages even if celebrated in a dif-
ferent state in accord with local law.110 A different explanation is
that the Court wanted to issue a robust ruling and thereby strike a
blow for marriage equality.111 The Court would not have wanted to
rest the opinion on Virginia’s being required to recognize marriages
validly celebrated elsewhere,112 because such a decision would have
left open whether states could refuse to permit such marriages to be
celebrated locally. Indeed, some commentators read Loving to be
implicitly ruling that the marriage had to be recognized because
validly celebrated elsewhere and, in addition, explicitly stating that
interracial marriages could not be prohibited locally.113
A little over a decade before Loving was decided, the Supreme
Court had the opportunity in Naim v. Naim114 to uphold the validity
of an interracial marriage celebrated in accord with local law, not-
withstanding Virginia’s refusal to recognize the marriage.115 Rather
than avail itself of the opportunity to hold that the marriage had to be
recognized because validly celebrated elsewhere, the Court instead
L.J. 15, 38–39 (2007) (“For the Lovings, the Supreme Court’s ruling paved the way for
them to return to their families and friends in their home state of Virginia.”).
110. A separate issue is whether a state must recognize a marriage validly celebrated
in a sister domiciliary state. See Mark Strasser, What’s Next After Windsor? 6 ELON L.
REV. 387, 397 (2014) (“Arguably, the right to travel precludes a state from refusing to
recognize a marriage that is valid in a sister domicile.”).
111. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, Reflections on Equality in Family Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1385, 1390 (2013) (“Perhaps the single most important and influential equality rul-
ing regarding family law is Loving v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court invalidated
the Virginia anti-miscegenation law that barred interracial marriage.”).
112. Some scholars contend that a marriage celebrated in a sister state must be rec-
ognized throughout the United States. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Mar-
riage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 4
(2005) (suggesting that “states might be constitutionally obligated to recognize marriages
that are valid where celebrated”).
113. Mae Kuykendall, Equality Federalism: A Solution to the Marriage Wars, 15 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 413 (2012) (“Because the Lovings left Virginia to marry in Wash-
ington D.C. and returned to Virginia after a short period, the marriage was ‘evasive’ but
otherwise unexceptionable as a marriage of two people of childbearing age. While the
overriding principle of the Court’s holding in Loving was racial equality, thus requiring
a sweeping mandate on the basis of individual rights of all persons in the United States,
its subtext was necessarily federalism. Its racial meaning overwhelmed its meaning for
marriage federalism.”).
114. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 750, vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), and adhered to
90 S.E.2d 849 (1956).
115. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956) (per curiam).
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suggested that the challenge to Virginia’s anti-miscegenation stat-
ute was “devoid of a properly presented federal question . . . .”116 The
Naim litigation was somewhat complicated, however, because it
involved two appeals to the United States Supreme Court,117 and
consideration of those two cases (as well as the actions by the Virginia
Supreme Court) will illustrate some of the complexities involved in
adopting rules for interstate marriage recognition.
C. Naim v. Naim
Ruby Elaine Naim sought to end her marriage to her husband
Han Say Naim,118 alleging that he had committed adultery119 and
that their marriage was in violation of Virginia’s Racial Integrity
Act.120 Even if it had been true that Han had committed adultery,121
Ruby might not have been able to secure a divorce on that basis122
if indeed she also had committed adultery.123 Rather than decide
whether one or both parties had committed adultery, the trial court
instead annulled the marriage because the parties were precluded
from marrying each other on account of their respective races.124
Han Say Naim appealed the decision to the Virginia Supreme Court,
challenging the power of the trial court to grant an annulment on
that basis.125
The Virginia Supreme Court provided the background informa-
tion as follows:
116. Id.
117. See Naim, 350 U.S. at 891 (1955); Naim, 350 U.S. at 985 (1956).
118. Mr. Naim’s name is rendered in multiple ways in case law: as “Han Say Naim” in
some and “Ham Say Naim” in others. For clarity, he will be referred to as “Han Say Naim”
or simply “Han” herein.
119. Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim, and the
Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 119 (1998) (“Ruby Elaine Naim, a white woman,
sought a divorce on the grounds of adultery.”).
120. Id. at 131 (“Ruby Elaine Naim sought to end the marriage either under the aegis
of the Racial Integrity Act, or through absolute divorce.”).
121. See id. (discussing “her allegation that [Han] Say Naim committed adultery in
November of 1952”).
122. Cf. Donaldson v. Donaldson, 27 Va. Cir. 327, 331 (1992) (“Under the doctrine of
recrimination, if both parties are guilty of adultery, both are barred from using adultery
as a ground for divorce.”) (citing Surbey v. Surbey, 5 Va. App. 119 (1987)).
123. Dorr, supra note 119, at 131 (“Ruby, however, appears to have engaged in marital
impropriety herself.”).
124. Id. at 119 (“Choosing not to rule on the divorce action, Kellam granted Ruby Elaine
Naim an annulment . . . .”).
125. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d, 749, 751 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), and
adhered to 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956) (“The first assignment of error charges that the trial court
was constitutionally without the power to annul the marriage on the basis of race . . . .”).
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The suit was brought by the appellee, who is a white person,
duly domiciled in Virginia. The appellant is a Chinese and was
a non-resident of the State at the time of the institution of the suit.
On June 26, 1952, they left Virginia to be married in North Caro-
lina. They were married in that State and immediately returned
to Norfolk, Virginia, where they lived together as husband and
wife. It is conceded that they left Virginia to be married in North
Carolina for the purpose of evading the Virginia law which for-
bade their marriage.126
The court then focused on “whether the statute in question is
beyond the power of the State to enact under the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,”127 arguing
that the Virginia statute was compatible with Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections.128 Allegedly, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
“prohibit the State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial
integrity of its citizens”129 and does not “den[y] the power of the State
to regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a mongrel
breed of citizens.”130 The court continued, “We find there no require-
ment that the State shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of
racial pride, but must permit the corruption of blood even though it
weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship.”131
When the Loving Court discussed why the Virginia statute was
unconstitutional, it referred to the justifications, offered by the Naim
court,132 to help establish that the Virginia laws were “designed to
maintain White Supremacy.”133 However, the part of the Naim de-
cision that is the focus of concern here is the court’s description of
the parties’ connection to Virginia.
When describing the relationships between Virginia and the
parties, the Naim court explained that “[t]he suit was brought by
the appellee [Ruby], who is a white person, duly domiciled in Vir-
ginia. The appellant [Han] is a Chinese and was a non-resident of
126. Id. at 750.
127. Id. at 751.
128. See id. at 752 (citing State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402–03 (1871)).
129. Id. at 756.
130. Id.
131. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756.
132. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (“In Naim, the state court concluded that
the State’s legitimate purposes were ‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,’ and
to prevent ‘the corruption of blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration of
racial pride,’ obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy. The court
also reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without
federal intervention, and, consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to ex-
clusive state control by the Tenth Amendment.”) (citing Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756).
133. Id. at 11.
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the State at the time of the institution of the suit.”134 Here, the court
seemed to be explaining why Virginia had jurisdiction over the divorce,
because the party seeking the divorce was domiciled in the state.135
Yet, the court did not confine its comments to establishing the
jurisdictional basis for granting the divorce, because it also discussed
the circumstances surrounding the marriage, namely, that the
parties “left Virginia to be married in North Carolina . . . and imme-
diately returned to Norfolk, Virginia, where they lived together as
husband and wife.”136 Here, the Virginia Supreme Court implied, ac-
curately, that Han and Ruby were intentionally going to North Caro-
lina to marry, because they knew that they were barred by Virginia
law from marrying.137
What may have caused some confusion for members of the United
States Supreme Court was the language chosen by the Virginia Su-
preme Court to describe the connections between the state and the
parties. The court mentioned that Ruby was domiciled in Virginia
at the time of the divorce.138 Rather than say that Ruby was domi-
ciled in Virginia prior to the marriage, however, the court instead
merely pointed out that the couple was in Virginia immediately be-
fore marrying in North Carolina.139 The United States Supreme
Court might have remanded to try to ascertain whether the Virginia
court’s mentioning domicile at the time of divorce but not at the time
of the marriage indicated that the couple’s connection to the state
at the time of the marriage was somewhat tenuous.
Suppose, for example, that Ruby and Han had planned to move
to North Carolina where their marriage was legal. In that event,
they would have been marrying in accord with the law of the domi-
cile at the time of the marriage. Even if they changed their minds
after having lived in North Carolina for a while and then moved
back to Virginia, it might still be argued that they had married in
accord with the law of their domicile at the time of the marriage.140
134. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 750.
135. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298–99 (1942) (“Thus it is plain
that each state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in
the institution of marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the
spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent.”).
136. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 750.
137. See Dorr, supra note 119, at 129 (“Informed that Virginia barred interracial mar-
riage, the two drove to Elizabeth City, North Carolina on June 26, 1952 to be married:
consciously attempting to evade the Racial Integrity Act.”).
138. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 750.
139. Id.
140. Cf. State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 247 (1877) (upholding validity of interracial marriage
celebrated in accord with the law of the domicile, South Carolina, even though the couple
was now living in North Carolina where their marriage could not be celebrated).
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The claim here is not that the Naims had planned on staying in North
Carolina, especially given that they immediately returned to Virginia
after the wedding,141 but merely that the United States Supreme
Court might have been seeking some clarification regarding where
the parties intended to live as a married couple.
When the Virginia Supreme Court decision was appealed, the
United States Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded:
The inadequacy of the record as to the relationship of the parties
to the Commonwealth of Virginia at the time of the marriage in
North Carolina and upon their return to Virginia, and the failure
of the parties to bring here all questions relevant to the disposition
of the case, prevents the constitutional issue of the validity of the
Virginia statute on miscegenation tendered here being considered
“in clean-cut and concrete form, unclouded” by such problems.142
Here, the Court at least seems to be wondering whether the
parties were domiciled in Virginia at the time of their marriage, as
the Court is seeking clarification with respect to “the relationship
of the parties to the Commonwealth of Virginia at the time of the
marriage in North Carolina . . . .”143 On remand, the Virginia Su-
preme Court did not offer any additional information about the par-
ties’ domicile at the time of the marriage,144 merely reiterating that
the couple “had gone to North Carolina to be married for the pur-
pose of evading the Virginia law which forbade their marriage, were
married in North Carolina and immediately returned to and lived
in Virginia as husband and wife.”145 This time, however, when the
Virginia Supreme Court decision was again appealed, the United
States Supreme Court wrote: “The decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia . . . in response to our order . . . leaves the case
devoid of a properly presented federal question.”146
Commentators discussing Naim tend not to focus on the United
States Supreme Court’s initial remand and then the Court’s subse-
quent failure to seek additional information when the Virginia court
141. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 750.
142. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam) (citing Rescue Army v. Mun.
Court, 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)).
143. Id.
144. Rebecca Schoff, Note, Deciding on Doctrine: Anti-Miscegenation Statutes and the
Development of Equal Protection Analysis, 95 VA. L. REV. 627, 638 (2009) (“The Virginia
Supreme Court then ‘refused to comply with the Court’s instructions; they denied that
the record was unclear and that state law permitted returning final decisions to trial
courts in order to gather additional evidence.’ ”) (quoting Michael J. Klarman, Brown and
Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 449 (2005)).
145. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Va. 1956).
146. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
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did not provide what was requested.147 Instead, the commentators
discuss why the Court might have refrained from addressing whether
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute violated equal protection guar-
antees, suggesting that the Court was unwilling to take on interracial
marriage bans on the heels of having just struck down segregation
in the schools in Brown v. Board of Education.148 The Court’s unwill-
ingness to address the equal protection issues raised by interracial
marriage bans has been sharply criticized.149 The focus here is not on
whether the Naim Court should have struck down the Virginia anti-
miscegenation statutes on equal protection or due process grounds
147. See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text (discussing the secondary literature
addressing Naim).
148. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions?
Justice Scalia, The Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1124–25 (2006) (“Fearing that the South would not accept a decision
striking such a strong emotional chord so soon after the original Brown decision, the Court
balked, allowing the vile ban on interracial marriage to persist for a dozen more years.”);
Richard Delgado, Naim v. Naim, 12 NEV. L.J. 525, 527 (2012) (“It would seem as though
the commentators are correct in observing that the main reason why the Court waited so
long was that it feared the consequences of a second major decision—a second bombshell—
coming on the heels of Brown.”); Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 755, 821–22 (2011) (“The Justices dodged Naim not because they thought that Jim
Crow marriage laws were legally or logically distinct from Jim Crow education laws. In-
stead, the Court feared that invalidating anti-miscegenation laws so closely on the heels
of Brown would compromise the validity of the school desegregation decisions because
opposition to interracial marriage was so widespread.”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and
Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 449 (2005) (“A majority of the Justices
apparently preferred being humiliated at the hands of truculent state jurists to further
stoking the fires of racial controversy ignited by Brown.”); Conor O’Mahony, If a Con-
stitution Is Easy to Amend, Can Judges Be Less Restrained? Rights, Social Change, and
Proposition 8, 27 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 217 (2014) (“In Naim v. Naim, the Supreme
Court declined to grant review of a decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia upholding
such legislation, even though it seemed to clearly contravene the principles that were at
the heart of the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.”). Indeed, the
Virginia court sought to distinguish the constitutional issues implicated in segregated
public schools from the constitutional issues implicated by interracial marriage bans. See
Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 754–55 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), and adhered
to 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956).
149. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 47 (2011) (“If the Equal Protection Clause truly prohibits states from banning inter-
racial marriage, then the Court’s decision in Naim v. Naim to dismiss the constitutional
challenge to state anti-miscegenation laws by concocting a jurisdictional defect was not
only cowardly but lawless.”); Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional
Inevitability of Same-Sex Marriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471, 478 (2012) (discussing “the Court’s
disgraceful and widely condemned decision to duck the issue of interracial marriage
when it first presented itself in Naim v. Naim”). However, some commentators seem to
take a more charitable view of the Court’s action. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would
Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 157 (2007)
(“The most famous example is Naim v. Naim, in which the Court refused to rule on the
constitutionality of a ban on racial intermarriage, largely because it feared that its ruling
would provoke outrage, in a way that might diminish the Court’s own authority.”).
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as the Loving Court did a little over a decade later,150 but on the
Court’s ostensible concern the first time the case was remanded.
When asking for more information about Virginia’s relationship
to the parties at the time of the marriage, the Court might have been
seeking to find out whether either of the parties had been domiciled
in Virginia at the time of the marriage.151 Whether the parties were
North Carolina rather than Virginia domiciliaries would not have
affected whether anti-miscegenation statutes themselves violate due
process and equal protection guarantees.152 However, if the couple
had been domiciled in a different state, married, and had then moved
to Virginia, there would have been a different ground to strike down
the refusal to recognize an interracial marriage without striking
down the anti-miscegenation laws themselves, namely, that a mar-
riage valid in a sister domiciliary state had to be recognized as valid
even if such a marriage could not be celebrated in the forum.153
D. Horizontal Federalism
States have long been forced to determine the conditions under
which they will recognize marriages validly celebrated elsewhere.154
Traditionally, those decisions were decided under state law rather
than Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.155 When addressing the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans, the Court could have
held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to per-
mit same-sex marriages to be celebrated but nonetheless does re-
quire states to recognize same-sex marriages if validly celebrated
elsewhere.156 There are important reasons, however, that the Court
was unlikely to do so.157
150. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
151. See Mark Strasser, Loving Revisionism: On Restricting Marriage and Subverting
the Constitution, 51 HOW. L.J. 75, 79 (2007) (“The Court might instead have believed that
the important issue was whether either of the parties was domiciled in Virginia when
the marriage was contracted in North Carolina.”).
152. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom
to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.”); id. (“These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
153. See State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 247 (1877) (upholding interracial marriage valid
in a sister domiciliary state at the time of its celebration without striking down the state
anti-miscegenation statute).
154. See Joanna L. Grossman, Defense of Marriage Act, Will You Please Go Now!, 2012
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 155, 161 (2012).
155. See id. (“These rules of interstate marriage recognition were not dictated by con-
stitutional mandates, but grew, instead, out of the common law principle of comity—respect
for the actions of sister states.”).
156. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.
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Several commentators have discussed horizontal federalism,158
which focuses on “the relationship of the states to each other.”159
One commentator has suggested that horizontal federalism might
be understood “as encompassing the set of constitutional mecha-
nisms for preventing or mitigating interstate friction that may arise
from the out-of-state effects of in-state decisions.”160 If limiting the
out-of-state effects of in-state decisions is the overriding goal, how-
ever, then one might expect that the Constitution would reduce or
eliminate friction between the states by severely limiting the extra-
territorial effects of state laws.161
One way to cash out this friction-reducing approach is to suggest
that states have little or no obligation to respect sister state sover-
eignty insofar as respecting another state’s sovereignty would under-
mine the sovereignty of the forum.162 Such an approach might be
justified by noting that each state would seem to have “an equiva-
lently strong claim to operate without interference from the others.”163
Yet, friction reduction may not be particularly easy to achieve in
the context of interstate marriage recognition. Consider two states,
one (Y) recognizing a particular kind of marriage and the other (N)
not recognizing it. Friction would be reduced for N were that state
158. See, e.g., David Blumberg, Influence of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
on State High Court Decisionmaking 1982–1997: A Study in Horizontal Federalism, 61
ALB. L. REV. 1583, 1583 (1998); Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493,
494 (2008); Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An Evalu-
ation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism,
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 289, 289 (2003); Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political
Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 59 (2014); Noah D. Hall,
Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes
Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 406 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in
an Age of Criminal Justice Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 263 (2005).
159. Steve Sanders, Is the Full Faith and Credit Clause Still “Irrelevant” to Same-Sex
Marriage?: Toward a Reconsideration of the Conventional Wisdom, 89 IND. L.J. 95, 106
(2014); see also Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Constitutional Limitations on Extraterritorial State
Power: State Regulation, Choice of Law, and Slavery, 83 MISS. L.J. 59, 110 (2014)
(describing horizontal federalism as focusing on “the proper allocation of power between
the states”).
160. Erbsen, supra note 158, at 503; see also Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 158, at 81
(“In horizontal federalism, . . . worries about the interstate frictions run so deep that some
even think that preventing friction is part of the very definition of horizontal federalism.”).
161. Cf. Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institu-
tional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 731 (2007)
(“The primary aspect of federalism these constitutional principles help determine is the
nature of interstate relations—what is generally termed ‘horizontal’ federalism . . . . As
a result of these constitutional principles, some extraterritorial state regulations unques-
tionably, and quite properly, are constitutionally impermissible.”).
162. See Alan M. Trammell, Toil and Trouble: How the Erie Doctrine Became Struc-
turally Incoherent (and How Congress Can Fix It), 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3249, 3277 (2014)
(“[W]ith regard to horizontal federalism, though, one state has only the most minimal
obligation to respect a sister state’s sovereignty.”).
163. Erbsen, supra note 158, at 508.
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not forced to recognize certain marriages the state believes contrary
to public policy. Yet, when Y recognizes a marriage, the state does
not merely seek to create a status that will only be recognized within
the state. On the contrary, it seeks to create a status that will be rec-
ognized in other states too, so permitting N not to recognize such
marriages will increase friction in Y.164
Horizontal federalism doctrine is not particularly helpful in the
context of interstate marriage recognition—it is simply unclear which
policies will reduce friction between the states. Deference to the
policies of each state will reduce friction in the objecting states but
increase it in those states recognizing the unions at issue. A policy
of non-deference will increase friction in the objecting states but
reduce it in those states affording recognition.
Not all commentators view friction as an unmitigated evil165—a
state’s being forced to confront a different state’s practices may bring
about beneficial change.166 But whether one views friction as some-
thing to be avoided or, instead, as something to be channeled, one
still will not have much guidance when attempting to decide whether
State Y or State N should be forced to bear the burdens associated
with the particular interstate marriage recognition practice adopted.167
Although not particularly helpful in providing a rationale for
deciding which state should be forced to bear the burdens associated
with states having differing positions regarding which marriages
should be recognized, horizontal federalism does offer the following
suggestion: whatever criterion is used for determining which state’s
policy should trump, that criterion should be based on some quality
other than statehood itself,168 as no state would have a more privi-
leged position than any other by virtue of being a state.169 A number
164. Cf. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 158, at 78 (“The conventional worry in hori-
zontal federalism, with its focus on territoriality and sovereignty, is that states that favor
marriage equality will impose that preference on states that don’t. But it might be just
as important to a state to have the same-sex marriages it has blessed recognized outside
of its territory.”).
165. See id. at 97 (“We need to think about how to harness friction rather than elim-
inate it.”).
166. See id. (“As more states began to marry same-sex couples and those couples began
to move, same-sex marriage became a reality for everyday Americans, even those residing
outside of blue enclaves. We cannot tell, of course, whether this day-to-day exposure has
helped further the cause of marriage equality. But one suspects it might have.”).
167. A separate issue involves the burdens posed by non-recognition on individual
families. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013).
168. See Erbsen, supra note 158, at 508 (“[T]here is no clearly discernible basis for
assessing how the Constitution allocates most powers among the states because the text
grants power en masse to the states as a whole.”).
169. Cf. id. (“Each state has an equivalently strong claim to exercise collectively held
powers absent a context-specific restraint.”).
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of possible criteria suggest themselves, for example, the domicile’s
law might be given priority over the law of a non-domicile, the law
of the domicile at the time of the marriage might be given priority
over the law of a subsequent domicile, etc.170
E. Traditional Practices
Traditionally, merely because a marriage could not be cele-
brated within the domicile would not mean that the domicile would
refuse to recognize it if validly celebrated elsewhere.171 Whether the
marriage would be recognized would depend upon a number of fac-
tors including the degree to which the marriage was thought to vio-
late public policy.172 The factors that were weighed in the domicile’s
determination of whether to recognize such a marriage, however,
did not include Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.173
The First and Second Restatements of the Conflict of Laws set
out some parameters with respect to interstate marriage recogni-
tion.174 Both Restatements suggest that a marriage valid in the
domicile at the time of the marriage should be recognized in other
non-domiciliary states.175 In addition, both Restatements suggest
that a marriage valid in the domicile at the time of the marriage
should be treated as valid throughout the United States,176 as long
as a narrowly defined exception is not met.177
170. See infra notes 187–97 and accompanying text.
171. Strasser, supra note 96, at 252 (“[T]he fact that the domicile could refuse to
recognize a marriage that was prohibited locally but validly celebrated elsewhere does
not mean the domicile would refuse to recognize such a marriage.”).
172. Cf. Anthony Dominic D’Amato, Note, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 911, 942 (1995) (“If Illinois does
not have a statute or judicial rule explicitly barring recognition, Illinois courts would
have to determine whether recognizing the marriage would violate a strong public policy
of the state of Illinois. If Illinois had such a policy, Illinois courts would not have to
recognize the marriage.”)
173. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
174. See Mark Strasser, Mission Impossible: On Baker, Equal Benefits, and the Im-
position of Stigma, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 7 (2000).
175. See id. at 10 (“Suppose that Vermont were to recognize same-sex marriages and
that a Vermonter were to marry her female partner. Suppose further that this same-sex
couple travelled to another state to honeymoon. If that second state subscribed to the
recognition position articulated in either the First or Second Restatements, that second
state would recognize the marriage, because the couple’s domicile (Vermont) recognizes
the union.”).
176. See Strasser, supra note 83, at 341 (“[B]oth Restatements, properly understood,
require that subsequent domiciliary states recognize those marriages valid in the states
of celebration and domicile at the time of the marriage.”).
177. See Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Mar-
riage and the Constitution, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 291 (1997) (noting that bigamous and
certain incestuous marriages are viewed as exceptions not subject to this rule).
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Yet, the practices described in the First and Second Restatements
have not thus far been held to be constitutionally required,178 and
the Court has never made clear, for example, whether a subsequent
domicile is constitutionally required to recognize a marriage valid
in a sister domicile at the time of the marriage’s celebration.179 The
case law includes suggestive comments, for example, the Loughran
Court explained that “[m]arriages not polygamous or incestuous, or
otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the
State where entered into, be recognized as valid in every other juris-
diction.”180 The articulated exception—such marriages would not be
valid if the law declared them void—referred to the law of the domi-
cile at the time of the marriage.181 That said, however, the Loughran
Court seemed to be describing choice-of-law practices,182 and the
Court might have had to address whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has implications for marriage recognition over and above the
constraints imposed on the states with respect to which marriages
must be recognized when celebrated within the state.
F. Fourteenth Amendment Guarantees
In Obergefell, the Court addressed whether same-sex marriage
bans violate Fourteenth Amendment guarantees,183 and whether
same-sex marriages validly celebrated in one state must be recognized
in other states.184 Because the Court held that same-sex marriage bans
178. Mark Strasser, Marriage, Transsexuals, and the Meaning of Sex: On DOMA, Full
Faith and Credit, and Statutory Interpretation, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 301, 327
(2003) (“It is simply unclear whether the Constitution requires that such marriages [those
valid in the domicile at the time of the marriage] be recognized in all of the states.”).
179. See Mark Strasser, DOMA, the Constitution, and the Promotion of Good Public
Policy, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 613, 630 (2012) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has not yet
addressed whether subsequent domiciles have the power to refuse to recognize marriages
that had been valid in a sister domicile at the time of the marriage’s celebration.”).
180. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (citing Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S.
76 (1877)).
181. See Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant
Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 307, 332 (1998)
(“When the Loughran Court was discussing the statute declaring the marriage void, the
Court was referring to the statute of the domicile.”).
182. See Strasser, supra note 178, at 326–27 (“Yet, the Loughran court [sic] did not
suggest that marriages valid in the states of celebration and domicile at the time of the
marriage would have to be recognized in every other jurisdiction as a constitutional
matter . . . .”).
183. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“[U]nder the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not
be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
184. See id. at 2608 (“[T]here is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful
same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”).
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themselves violate Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, states can-
not refuse to recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in
other states.185
Suppose that the Obergefell Court had adopted a different ap-
proach. Holding that states must recognize same-sex marriages validly
celebrated elsewhere would not have entailed that states had to
permit such marriages to be celebrated within the states,186 so the
Court could have adopted the valid-where-celebrated approach as a
kind of compromise. Such a compromise would have been difficult
to strike, however, without undermining what the Court has already
suggested about same-sex marriage,187 and without having impor-
tant implications for federalism more generally.188
The Fourteenth Amendment reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.189
The Fourteenth Amendment provides three different possible
bases—privileges and immunities, equal protection, and due process
guarantees—upon which the Court might hold that although states
may refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage celebrated locally (e.g.,
in a religious ceremony), they must recognize such marriages if validly
celebrated elsewhere. The rationales that might be employed under
these differing guarantees overlap to some extent.
The right to travel is included within privileges and immunities
guarantees,190 which means that the Court could have focused on
185. See id.
186. Cf. Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120, 125 (1875) (recognizing interracial marriage
validly celebrated elsewhere even though such marriages could not be celebrated within
the state).
187. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (“The differentiation
demeans the [same-sex] couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution pro-
tects . . . .”) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
188. See id. at 2691 (“State laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must
respect the constitutional rights of persons [citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)],
but, subject to those guarantees, ‘regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.’ ”) (citing Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
190. See Lide E. Paterno, Note, Federalism, Due Process, and Equal Protection: Stereo-
scopic Synergy in Bond and Windsor, 100 VA. L. REV. 1819, 1837 (2014) (“[I]n Saenz v.
Roe, the majority located the right to interstate travel in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause . . . .”).
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whether right to travel guarantees are implicated when states refuse
to recognize certain marriages. Arguably, right to travel guarantees
protect marriages valid in the domicile at the time of the marriage.191
To say that one must surrender one’s marriage as the price of emi-
grating to a new state is to impose a heavy burden upon emigrating
to that state.192
Some commentators have argued, in addition, that the right to
travel should be understood to protect any marriages valid in the
state of celebration.193 Whether that understanding is correct de-
pends in part on whether individuals have a legitimate expectation
that a marriage celebrated in another state within their own coun-
try will be recognized in their domicile,194 even when their domicile
prohibits such marriages.
Due process guarantees may implicate marriage recognition in
two distinct ways:
1. Marriage is a fundamental interest and statutes must
be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state inter-
est to justify overriding that interest.195 If the state
cannot meet its burden, then the state must recognize
the marriages when celebrated locally.
2. Due process guarantees might also be thought to serve
another role, namely, to require states to recognize a
marriage validly celebrated within another domiciliary
state or, perhaps, another celebratory state.196 Here, due
process protects the liberty interest acquired by virtue
of having celebrated a marriage in accord with the law
191. See Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex
Couples, and the Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 553, 554 (2000).
192. See Strasser, supra note 61, at 315 (“One issue that might be raised is whether
the latter state could refuse to recognize this couple’s marriage, i.e., the price of moving
to the new state would be the surrender of their marriage.”).
193. See Singer, supra note 112, at 46 (“Only a rule that requires recognition of mar-
riages that are valid where celebrated will avoid the problem of inconsistent obligations,
promote interstate commerce and the right to travel, and treat same sex couples as equal
persons before the law.”).
194. Cf. Sanders, supra note 159, at 100 (suggesting that the place of celebration rule
“ ‘confirms the parties’ expectations’ ”) (quoting WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L.
REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 398 (3d ed. 2002)).
195. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2714 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
196. See Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage,
110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2012) (“[A]n individual who legally marries in her state of
domicile, and then migrates to another state that becomes her new domicile, has a sig-
nificant liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in the on-
going existence of her marriage. This liberty interest creates a right of marriage recognition
that prevents a mini-DOMA state from effectively divorcing her by operation of law.”).
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of the state of celebration, even if that liberty interest
is not thought sufficiently fundamental to be ranked
as fundamental.197
If the Court were to have adopted the approach whereby marry-
ing in another state creates a significant liberty interest, the Court
would have had to explain why the implicated liberty interest in
one’s having married in another state is not itself fundamental.
Further, if the Court were to start down this road, it might have to
address a related issue. When one state claims to have a compelling
interest in not recognizing certain marriages but other states recog-
nize such marriages without suffering dire consequences, can it really
be plausibly maintained that the former state has a compelling in-
terest in not recognizing such marriages?
It should be noted that the difficulty suggested here does not
disappear now that the Court has issued a decision on the merits
with respect to whether federal guarantees protect the right to
marry a same-sex partner. If one state recognizes first cousin mar-
riages and another does not, the latter state may be hard-pressed to
explain what compelling interests are served by that prohibition in
light of the non-disastrous experience of the former state.
Equal protection guarantees might also be viewed as two-pronged:
1. They might provide the basis upon which same-sex
marriage bans are struck down as a general matter.
Thus, the Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes were
struck down because they violated equal protection
guarantees.198
2. Equal protection guarantees might also operate in a
more limited way. When a state is willing to recognize
certain but not other marriages celebrated elsewhere
but prohibited locally, there should be some legitimate
basis upon which these recognition policies are based.
Absent some recognizable justification, the state may
be inferred to be acting arbitrarily.
Consider a state that recognizes any marriage celebrated in a
sister state with the sole exception that this state refuses to recog-
nize a same-sex marriage validly celebrated elsewhere.199 Bracket
197. But cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of fun-
damental importance for all individuals.”).
198. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
199. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-38 (2015) (“Any marriage contracted outside the
jurisdiction of this state, except a marriage contracted between two persons of the same
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ing same-sex marriages, this state recognizes various marriages,
regardless of how much such marriages are thought to violate public
policy and thus are prohibited in the domicile. One might wonder
what special state interests would justify singling out same-sex
marriages for non-recognition. If no such justification can be offered,
then the court might infer that animus or improper purpose is mo-
tivating the non-recognition.200
CONCLUSION
When the Obergefell Court held that same-sex marriage bans
themselves violate constitutional guarantees, it was unsurprising
for the Court to hold, in addition, that states must recognize such
marriages if validly celebrated elsewhere. The Court did not need to
address the conditions, if any, under which marriages prohibited
locally must nonetheless be recognized if celebrated in accord with
the law of another state.
Were the Court to have held that states may prohibit same-sex
marriages without violating federal constitutional guarantees, the
Court would have had to suggest that there was a sufficiently im-
portant reason justifying such a ban. Such a holding, however, would
have contradicted much of the tenor of Windsor.201 Were the Court
in addition to have suggested that states could not refuse to recog-
nize same-sex marriages if validly celebrated elsewhere, the Court
would then have had to specify why the interests justifying the
refusal to recognize such marriages when celebrated within the state
were not sufficiently compelling to justify the refusal to recognize
them when celebrated elsewhere. When doing so, the Court would
have had to keep in mind how its analysis would affect interstate rec-
ognition based on other classifications about which states disagree,
e.g., marriage restrictions based on consanguinity or affinity. In addi-
tion, the Court might have needed to address the background condi-
tions under which such unions would have to be recognized, e.g.,
whenever valid where celebrated or only if valid in the domicile at the
time of the marriage. Such a holding would invite a general analysis
concerning which marriages, validly celebrated somewhere in the
country, would have to be recognized throughout the country and,
perhaps, whether the validity of a marriage is established according
gender, which is valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which such marriage was con-
tracted, is valid in this state.”), invalidated by Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 61 F. Supp. 3d
862 (S.D. 2015).
200. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
201. Cf. Strasser, supra note 83, at 381, 383.
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to the law of the domicile or according to the law of the state of cele-
bration or according to some other rule.
Traditionally, marriage is a matter of state rather than federal
law.202 Current constitutional jurisprudence does not make clear,
however, which state law determines validity.203 Although this is an
important issue that should be addressed, it applies to more than
same-sex marriages and the Court was understandably reluctant to
announce a general rule regarding interstate recognition of marriages.
Currently, states differ about the age of consent,204 and the pro-
hibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity,205 although they agree
about many matters. Judging from current practices, there would not
be a wholesale change in marriage laws were the state of celebration
rule adopted. Nonetheless, the Court would have to offer some account
of how its holdings fit into the current federalism jurisprudence.
By holding that same-sex marriage bans themselves violate con-
stitutional guarantees, the Court did not need to fully address in-
terstate marriage recognition issues, just as the Court did not focus
on those issues in either Naim or Loving. That said, now that same-
sex marriage has been taken off the table, confusions about the
202. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013).
203. See Strasser, supra note 83, at 340.
204. Compare ALA. CODE § 30-1-4 (2015) (“A person under the age of 16 years is in-
capable of contracting marriage.”), with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-301 (West 2015).
(a) The age of consent for marriage for both the male and the female is eigh-
teen years of age. A person under the age of eighteen lacks the capacity
to contract a marriage without the consent required by this section.
(b) The clerk of the county commission may issue a marriage license to an
applicant who is under the age of eighteen but sixteen years of age or
older if the clerk obtains a valid written consent from the applicant’s
parents or legal guardian.
(c) Upon order of a circuit judge, the clerk of the county commission may
issue a marriage license to an applicant who is under the age of sixteen,
if the clerk obtains a valid written consent from the applicant’s parents
or legal guardian. A circuit judge of the county in which the application
for a marriage license is filed may order the clerk of the county com-
mission to issue a license to an applicant under the age of sixteen if, in
the court’s discretion, the issuance of a license is in the best interest of
the applicant and if consent is given by the parents or guardian.
Id. § 48-2-301.
205. Compare IND.CODE ANN. § 31-11-8-3 (West 2015) (“A marriage is void if the parties
to the marriage are more closely related than second cousins. However, a marriage is not
void if: (1) the marriage was solemnized after September 1, 1977; (2) the parties to the
marriage are first cousins; and (3) both of the parties were at least sixty-five (65) years
of age when the marriage was solemnized.”), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106(a) (West
2015) (“All marriages between parents and children, including grandparents and grand-
children of every degree, between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole
blood, and between uncles and nieces, and between aunts and nephews, and between first
cousins are declared to be incestuous and absolutely void.”).
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constitutional parameters of interstate marriage recognition re-
main. Those issues deserve discussion and resolution, although it
was understandable that the Obergefell Court did not want to enter
into that thicket, because doing so would have undermined both what
the Court has already suggested about constitutional protection of
same-sex unions in particular and what has been said about state
control of domestic relations as a general matter.
